Chapter 1 Debunking Traditional Explanations
The usual "internalist" explanations for the European originality
religion, culture, genetics, climate, third-world abuse,
Greek heritage, pure hazard are dismissed. None of these
elements can pretend to shed light on the long-term European success.
They basically fail at the two following stumbling blocks:
Eastern Europe backwardness and leadership fluctuations among
Eastern Europe is religiously, culturally, ethnically,
climatically very similar to Western Europe. Nonetheless, it
has always been lagging backward, for centuries if not more,
painfully catching up with Western advances, but never leading
During some periods of time, China, India or the Middle
East led the way in science and technology. This does not fit
well with the idea of an inherent (religious, cultural, ethnical,
etc.) superiority of the West. If, on the other side, one admits
important changes in those inherent abilities, these remain
Greek heritage must be rejected because the Romans, the Muslims,
the Indians too could benefit from it. Randomness is not an
acceptable answer, it merely amounts to giving up searching for
Chapter 2 The Economic and Political Theory (European case, 11th to 18th century)
Chap 2 discloses the theory. For science and technology to advance
in a given civilization, two conditions are required: a thriving
economy and a stable political division. That is, a rich and
stable states system is needed. Western Europe enjoyed growing trade
and manufacturing, and was divided between long-lasting
competitive kingdoms, during the whole 2nd millenium; this is
why it succeeded the way it did.
A wealthy economy fosters scientific and technical progresses in several ways:
1) it generates a surplus which can be invested in non-immediately profitable activities, as science and arts.
2) merchants, bankers and entrepreneurs have a strong bent towards accuracy, numbers, (ac-)counting, weighting, timeliness, measurement. When successful, they impose gradually this kind of science-friendly mentality upon their social environment.
3) merchants, bankers and entrepreneurs have a vested interest in science and technology: they support development in mathematics (accounting arithmetic, higher-degree equations for interest rate calculations, statistics for stock exchange trading and insurances, etc.). In the Middle Ages, they supported the development of accurate clocks for measuring manufacturing and travelling times, of accurate maps for travelling, of astronomy for navigation, and of course of all sorts of new technical devices, since increasing manufacturing productivity and decreasing transport costs brings profit. The mercantile community, when successful, would financially support individuals active in those fields.
Stable political division helps science and technology in several ways:
1) It generates freedom. No center has a monopoly of power, no government
can control or suppress everything. A scientist or a technician who are
prosecuted in a given country can shelter in another one. Same for ideas
2) Competition between states generates a profitable stimulation. Every government
wants to do better (or at least not worse) than neighbouring countries.
Hence governmental support for science academies.
3) War exercices a continuous pressure towards modernization, it creates
a strong government interest for new technical devices and for improving
technical knowledge and education. War does not wreak too much havoc in
the case of durable states, hence the need for a stable political division.
In particular, the smart European scientific professional structure,
the institutions that allowed scientists to make a living while doing
research universities, royal academies, private mathematical schools, etc.
could come to life and survive only thanks to the existence
of the wealthy and stable Western European states system.
In this context, the XVIth-XVIIth century Scientific Revolution can be
interpreted as the logical outcome of the economic and military
revolutions that Western Europe underwent in the same period 1500-1700.
The difference between the two parts of Europe becomes clear here.
Western Europe had a favourable economic and political background
during the whole 2nd millenium, that is, it enjoyed a rich and durable
states system. Eastern Europe suffered from bad economic and political
conditions. Eastern Europe's states were unstable, they underwent
fast boundary moves. Moreover, most of the time trade was weak
and manufacturing was rickety.
Merchants never thrived half as well as their Western counterparts.
Chapters 3, 4, 5 The Economic and Political Theory (Middle East, India, China)
Chap 3, 4, 5, demonstrate that the rich states system theory explains quite well the different stages of the scientific evolutions of the Middle-East, India and China. Each time prosperity and stable division are there, scientific knowledge flourishes. In all other cases (political unity, fast-changing boundaries and/or economical doldrums), science recedes.
Each civilization is studied century after century, period after period, because they do not experience a constant economic and political situation. So, to get a clear picture, one must consider each period separately.
The book devotes 110 pages to analyze the political and economical histories of the Middle East, India and China in relation to the evolution of science and technology. This is arguably the most original element in the book's approach, since, generally, authors studying scientific history focus on the West, devoting only a few pages to other civilizations, without distinguishing between the (very) different periods.
For example, the rich states system theory neatly solves the mysterious ups and downs in Chinese scientific history. The interval from 750 to 1280 was highly productive in scientific and technical progress because China enjoyed a rather stable division and a very dynamic trade and manufacturing. After 1280, political unity set in and science stopped.
Chapter 6 The Coastline Shape Hypothesis
In chap 6, I find out why only Western Europe benefited from prosperity
and stable division during such a long time: the main cause
is the shape of its coastline.
The Western part of the European
continent is the only densely populated area on Earth boasting
as many peninsulas, gulfs, straits, inland seas, while still being
for the most part an interconnected land.
Such an articulated
coastline enhances trade, because sea accessibility makes maritime
transportation easier. The sea route is much better than river
or land transportation. Before modern times, it was safer, quicker,
freer and tremendously cheaper.
Moreover, an articulated coastline
defines naturally limited core areas within which polities can live
their lives without being too much disturbed Britain, Ireland,
Spain, France, Denmark, Sweden, Italy are cases in point.
The long-term stable political division stems from that advantage,
as the sea is the best possible boundary for a state.
In mathematical terms, the quality of a coastline is measured
by Mandelbrot's fractal dimension of the coastline. The higher
the dimension, the better the shore articulation. I made some
measurements on maps and obtained that Europe has a fractal dimension
of 1.46, much higher than China (1.26), India (1.14) and
the Middle East (1.13). Those differences are significant because
this fractal dimension figure can only take values between 1 and 2.
The coastline shape difference between Western Europe
and Northern Africa shows up clearly on that map
Eastern Europe does not enjoy as good a shore profile as Western
Europe: it is a mainly landlocked area. Vast surfaces are deprived
of sea access: the seas are too far-away; to make things worse,
they are often closed or ice-blocked seas. Hence, trade could not
take off, and no natural boundary protected the regions's states,
which were brittle and short-lived. This is the reason why this
region did not perform well in science and technology.
Chapter 7 The Greek Miracle Explained
Chap 7 shows that the rich states system theory explains
the ancient Greek miracle as well. The Greeks formed
a lasting states system, enlivened by a brisk trade,
both element thriving on the very indented and articulated
coastline of the Aegean sea. Only the Southern part of
Greece nurtured the miracle, because it had abundant
access to the sea. The mostly landlocked Northern part
of Greece stayed apart from the scientific adventure.
So the Southern/Northern opposition in ancient Greece
mirrors the Western/Eastern opposition in modern Europe.
The miracle lasted until military technological progress
overshot the possibilities of the Greek geographical platform.
Then, the scene extended to the whole Eastern Mediterranean
region, which the Greeks conquered. Huge Greek states
formed in Egypt, Mesopotamia, Asia minor, which could
go on with the competition, but only for a while: the new
territories did not have an articulated coastline.
The economy slumped down (this was compounded by demographic
decline) and a more and more unstable division settled,
ruining the Greek world and ending the "miracle".
Greece has a nicely articulated coastline
at smaller scales than Western Europe
Chapter 8 Evolution of the West, 19th and 20th Centuries
In chap 8, I apply the theory to the 19th and 20th centuries. The states system
of Western Europe continued on its course, generating scientific progress
at a fast pace, until the first part of the 20th century, when technological
progress in the military domain (essentially tanks and airplanes) rendered
the European continent too small. At this stage, the states system destroyed
itself (2nd World War). Greater states were required for the competition
to continue. The USA and USSR, luckily, were there. They continued the battle
until, again, the military technology (thermonuclear bombs and intercontinental
missiles) exceeded the possibilities of the geographical platform.
But this time, technology was so powerful that war simply became impossible
on Earth between great powers, ushering in the nuclear peace era in which we
still live now.
Chapter 9 Present Situation and Near Future
In chap 9, I develop several contemporary topics, like the Asian boom
and the sharp drop of science in Russia. I show that, today as ever,
only two forces prop up science: stable division and prosperity: governments,
companies and donators are the funders of science. They can assume
that role only if the necessary ressources are there, hence if the economy
fares well. Also, only the freedom of a multicenter world allows
research to go on unfettered (think of cloning, assisted fecundation,
and so on). Furthermore, inter-state prestige or trade competitions
are a crucial motivation behind that financing.
As a consequence, one can take scientific progress for granted in the future
as long as some region in the world will enjoy prosperity and stable
division this progress shall be a bit weaker, however, with the
waning of the military pillar.
Finally, the epilogue generalizes the theory for the space age (that never came).
Planet Earth has become too small to stand large conflicts between great powers, but wars
with missiles and nuclear bombs could still be waged in the interplanetary medium.
I briefly study the quality of our stellar system in that respect. In the same way
as not all coastline profiles allow for long-lasting rich states systems, similarly,
not all "planetographies" foster such lush combination at the space age level. The
result of this investigation is that, unfortunately, our neighbouring planetary environment
seems hopelessly forbidding. We are not going to experience in the future another
full-fledged "miracle", like the Greek and the European ones in the past.