A paper by Axel Gosseries on inter-generational justice, quoting my book La Faillite coupables des retraites (2003/2004) (see p.3, yellow marks). Published in Gaia - Ecological Perspectives for Science and Society, 14(1), p.40-46.

All papers by same author on this website:
–Axel Gosseries:  Paper 1  "The Egalitarian case..." in Gaia, Ecological Perspectives...   (Mar 2005)
–Axel Gosseries:  Paper 2  "Dette Générationnelle..." in R. Pellet: Economica   (Feb 2006)

After the internet version, March 2005. Source 1, Source 2.
The Failure of Pension Systems

Introduction Sustainable development has become a key concept in public
Page 1
Lead Paragraph: Sustainability is not only a matter of justice. Still, any
plausible theory of sustainable development needs to be explicit about the
philosophical views it necessarily embodies on intergenerational justice.
This requires some detailed work on the philosophical side, with
potentially unexpected outcomes. One of them is that it may be unjust to
transfer more to the next generation than what we inherited from the
previous one. And another one is that Brundtland’s often cited view on the
matter may not be as obviously just as it seems.
Sustainable development has become a key concept in public
discourse. No doubt the idea of intergenerational justice constitutes
one of its central components. Still, there are only very few attempts
within the sustainability literature to examine precisely what
intergenerational justice could mean, given the level of
sophistication available in the field of philosophical theories of
justice. This paper aims to provide a critical overview of the various
philosophical theories of intergenerational justice, and to show that
some of them may be more robust than others. Moreover, it aims at
indicating the extent to which sustainable development, as defined
in the Brundtland report <1> is unable to reject two major
intergenerational injustices.
Abstract: At the heart of any concept of sustainable development lies an
idea of intergenerational justice. The latter can be understood in various
ways, depending on the general theory of justice one considers most
defensible. The author spells out six possible philosophical views on the
matter. He shows the extent to which differences in logic also translate as
significant differences in the intergenerational principles to be followed,
using notions of savings and dis-savings. Special attention is being paid to
two reasons why the directives of a luck egalitarian theory of
intergenerational justice do not necessarily coincide with Brundtland’s
view on intergenerational justice. Such differences become clear once we
understand that, as a matter of principle, luck egalitarians should oppose
not only generational dis-savings, but also generational savings, hence
stick to a strict “neither less, nor more” rule.
Among the assumptions at play here, let us underline two. On the
one hand, we will only look at the size of the basket of « goods »
(broadly understood) to be transferred by each generation to the
next one. The nature of the goods to be included in this basket will
not be discussed here. It is full of elements that constitute capital,
broadly understood, namely a physical component, but also
technological, cultural, relational, political… element. Hence, we
shall not address here the substitution issue (e.g. can we substitute
oil consumption with new technologies, or biodiversity with
musical discoveries ?). This is of course central to the weak v. strong
sustainability debate.
Keywords: Intergenerational Justice, Brundtland, Rawls, Growth,
Sustainability, Luck egalitarianism, Sufficientarianism.
The Egalitarian Case Against Brundtland’s Sustainability
Axel Gosseries
1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
E-mail :
Postal address :
Chaire Hoover d’éthique économique et sociale
The author wishes to thank A.-P. André-Dumont, P.-M. Boulanger, M.
Howard, D. Robichaud, I. Schumacher, C. Wolf and a referee from GAIA
for comments on an earlier draft.
Université catholique de Louvain
Place Montesquieu, 3
The Egalitarian Case Against Brundtland’s Sustainability : 1

Page 2
On the other hand, we shall assume that the global population size
remains constant over time. The latter assumption is significant.
Due to their internal logic, some theories will arguably tend to be
indifferent to population changes (e.g. this would follow from a
standard version of the indirect reciprocity view presented below)
whereas others will more naturally endorse a per capita proviso (e.g.
the egalitarian views set out below). Theories of the latter type may
thus be especially demanding in a context of growing population.
Conversely, it is often overlooked that while population decline
may be a problem from the point of view of financing pension and
health care systems in aging populations, it also entails that, for
such population-sensitive normative theories, a lesser global capital
will have to be transferred to the next generation if the latter is less
The first theory, formulated and discussed in a very explicit way by
authors such as Barry <2> and Masson <3> is called indirect
reciprocity. The basic idea behind such a view is that our moral
obligations towards other people can only be envisaged within a
reciprocity framework. This is for example the case for people who
consider in the intragenerational context that only those who have
contributed through their work in the past or who will contribute in
the future should be granted unemployment benefits if needed. In
the intergenerational context, one may suspect that this is actually a
widespread view among the public.
Two maxims are involved, the
former providing us with an explanation as to why we would have
any obligation towards the next generation, the latter defining the
content of our intergenerational obligations:
Moreover, for each of the theories we present, the reader will be
provided with a short synoptic table involving the concepts of
savings and dis-savings. For present purposes, there is (positive)
savings (hereinafter : SAV) whenever a generation is transferring to
the next one more capital (broadly understood) than the one it
inherited itself from the previous generation. Conversely, there is
dis-savings (hereinafter : DIS) whenever a generation transfers to
the next one less valuable a capital than the one it inherited itself
from the previous generation. Moreover, there will be three
modalities : prohibition (hereinafter : PROHIB), authorisation
(hereinafter (AUTHO), obligation (hereinafter : OBLI). Hence, if a
given theory allows each generation to transfer less to the next one
than what it inherited from the previous one, we refer to it as “DIS
AUTHO”. If it is expected to transfer more, we signal it as “SAV
OBLI”. Let us now examine each of the theories in turn.
Maxim 1 : The current generation owes something to the next one
because it received something from the previous one.
Maxim 2 : The current generation should transfer to the next one
capital at least equivalent to the one it inherited itself from the
previous generation.
For all those associating justice with reciprocity, the concept of
indirect reciprocity is powerful since it allows us to justify
obligations towards people who did not do anything for us so far,
and who will perhaps end up having given us less than we will
have given them. Whereas in the case of direct reciprocity, it is the
original benefactor who ends up recuperating the equivalent of
what he gave in the first place, in the case of indirect reciprocity as
understood here, it is a third party (here : the next generation) who
For an empirical study providing indications of the popularity of the
« indirect reciprocity » view: <4>
Indirect Reciprocity
The Egalitarian Case Against Brundtland’s Sustainability : 2

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Still, indirect reciprocity as defined above has to face three serious
difficulties, the third one being the most general one. First, maxim 1
presupposes the idea that we have obligations towards earlier
generations, hence towards dead people as well. For it is they who
are supposed to generate our obligations towards the next
generation. Still, for a state to justify its sustainable development
policies on the basis of obligations towards dead people seems
rather incompatible with the requirement of a minimal neutrality
towards the various conceptions of the good life as well as towards
the variety of metaphysical views. Indeed, it can be shown that
obligations towards the dead only make sense if we can claim that
dead people do exist in a morally relevant sense. Such an
assumption is probably far from shared by a majority among us.
Second, Maxim 1 cannot be applied to a hypothetical first generation,
since the latter would not - by definition – have received anything
from any generation preceding it. This theory is therefore unable to
tell us what would be wrong in a first generation squandering a
significant part of the capital it began with. Third – and finally -,
there is an even more serious difficulty. The very idea of reciprocity
is problematic if one aims at using it as a basis for a full theory of
justice. For example, for all those who consider – in the
intragenerational context - that a person suffering from a major
genetic disability should be granted at least decent social benefits,
this could in principle only be done – for those willing to remain
within a reciprocity framework – if we can reasonably expect this
person to give us the equivalent in return in the future. Once we
accept the reasonable assumption that most of us would want
society - in the intragenerational context - to grant such a person
with social benefits irrespectively of her ability to give something in
return, we have to ask ourselves why this idea of reciprocity should
remain at the heart of our theory of intergenerational justice. Hence,
there are good reasons to look for other possible views.
replaces the original benefactor (here : the current generation). To
take a family-based example, children (Generation 3) will be
provided with generous funding for university studies at will by -
or will inherit family photos from - their parents (Generation 2) “in
return” for the fact that their grandparents (Generation 1) did the
same for their own children (Generation 2).
Notice that this standard view is only one out of three possible
models of intergenerational reciprocity. Indeed, one alternative
indirect reciprocity model goes in the opposite direction : the
current generation owes something to the previous one because of
what the previous one did for the one that preceded it. This is the
case with “pay-as-you-go” pension schemes. Generation 2 (those
who are currently active) owes retirement benefits to the members
of Generation 1 (those who are now retiring) on the understanding
that Generation 3 (those who did not enter the labour market yet)
will do the same for Generation 2 in the future. And there is as well
the theoretical if not practical possibility of a model of
intergenerational justice built strictly on direct reciprocity grounds.
This can be illustrated by Cosandey’s « double reciprocity » view
<5> according to which we owe something to the previous
generation in return for what they have given us and we owe
something to the next one in return for what they will give us.
The standard indirect reciprocity view is a rather robust theory that
is immune to various possible objections. For example, we can
answer the query of those asking why a mere gift could ever give
rise to an obligation to give in return. For this objection can be
rejected by underlining the fact that such a generation should be
regarded as a free rider generation. It takes advantage of the
intergenerational train without paying its ticket, hence benefiting
without reciprocity from the sacrifices made by earlier generations.
The Egalitarian Case Against Brundtland’s Sustainability : 3

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One alternative to indirect reciprocity rests on the notion of a
collective intergenerational property. The Earth – understood in
very broad terms as containing both our natural and cultural
heritage - belongs here to all the generations, and most significantly
to the current and future ones. There are various ways of defending
this view. Either we just state it as an assumption. Or, we refer to it
as the will of God, as John Locke did.
A more interesting way of
justifying intergenerational collective property relies on more
empirical assumptions and is suggested by Bourgeois <7>. Imagine
first that the first generation was fully entitled to waste whatever it
wanted from its initial endowment. Still, let us assume as well that
at least some of the past generations bequeathed what they had
inherited not only to the benefit of the very next generation, but also
for the benefit of all coming generations. This is a plausible
assumption from a historical point of view, especially given the
large number of generations that followed each other. We can then
envisage the following scenario. While having been initially the
exclusive property of the first generation(s), as generations started
appearing that wanted the whole set of coming generations to be
regarded as the owners of the Earth, the Earth progressively
acquired the status of an intergenerationally collective property,
because of the will of (a few of) the past generations.
Hence, the idea of an intergenerational collective property of what
we inherited from the previous generation has various possible
roots. It exhibits however a twofold characteristic worth some
emphasis. On the one hand, the operational principle derived from
this view is identical to the one embodied in an indirect reciprocity
view (prohibition on dis-savings). On the other hand, the
underlying logic is clearly distinct. For, under an indirect reciprocity
logic, the reason why we owe something to the next generation is
because we received something from the previous one. In contrast,
under the collective property model, the reason why we owe our
children something is simply because what we have is as much
theirs as ours. There is a shift from giving « back » what is ours to
giving back what is not (only) ours. Notice however that in the case
of a justification « à la Bourgeois », a reference to the past – hence to
dead people - is not totally absent. For it is only if one respects the
will of the past generations that had a collectivistic view (i.e. that
bequeathed the Earth to all coming generations, as opposed to the
one just following them), that one may then justify the collective
property idea.
Collective property
All this connects moreover with the famous North American Indian
say : « Treat the Earth well : it was not given to you by your parents,
it was loaned to you by your children. We do not inherit the Earth
from our Ancestors, we borrow it from our children ».
formulation is not totally unambiguous however, for if it were to be
interpreted as meaning that no current generation could ever own
the Earth, then it would in a sense always remain no generation’s
property (res nullius). It would always be lent to all generations,
whichever it is. In contrast, if it were to be interpreted as a
translation of the idea of collective property, then we would not see
why the lending and borrowing language should be relied upon,
since it does not make sense for a current generation to borrow
what is already its own (at least in part).
See <6>, at §8
Various internet sources
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Let us now explore another theory : utilitarianism. It is
characterised by its preoccupation with people’s welfare (utilitas in
Latin). More importantly, it also claims that the fairest way of
organising society is the one that maximises the aggregate welfare of
its members. This is the reason why we refer to it as an aggregative
theory. There are several unsound reasons to criticise utilitarianism.
What is true however, is that it is not primarily concerned with the
distribution of welfare across members of society. What matters for
utilitarians is the aggregate size of the welfare pie from which
society as a whole will benefit, not the relative size of the pieces
each member will end up with. Therefore, it may well advocate
sacrificing the well-being of a few people (entailing e.g. slavery for
each of them) whenever this would be necessary for society as a
whole to maximize its aggregate welfare (here : each member of a
large majority deriving a small amount of extra welfare from the
slavery condition of a tiny minority). Hence utilitarianism – because
of its aggregativism – is more likely than other theories to lead to
sacrificial consequences.
In the intergenerational context, this is a crucial fact. Giving up the
consumption of part of our capital today may enable « us » –
provided that this capital is invested properly – to consume much
more capital in a more or less close future. Think about a bag of
seeds, part of which is being used to bake bread today and the rest
being sown in order to increase the amount of seeds available
during the following year. Hence, savings (in the sense of
transferring to the next generation more than what we inherited
from the previous one) is not only authorised. It is even required by
utilitarians, given that the goal is to maximise the size of the
intergenerational pie of welfare. This entails that the first
generations in history will have to tighten up their belts in order to
allow for investments that will only benefit the next generations.
This is a worrying result once we consider an indefinite number of
generations. For one way of interpreting utilitarianism would then
consist in asking each and every generation to sacrifice itself
without ever knowing if any significant number of generations will
follow and be able to benefit from such sacrifice. A sacrifice to no
one’s benefit (given the permanent uncertainty as to how many
generations will follow) is certainly a very problematic outcome.
Utilitarians are of course aware of this kind of result. They have
proposed to introduce a discounting factor (e.g. about the importance
to be given to the respective welfare units of each generation).
However, such an ad hoc approach has not so far been developed in
a convincing manner, able to avoid the symmetric problem of
systematically disadvantaging the coming generations.
Hence, the conjunction of the (potentially) productive nature of
capital investment and of the indefinite nature of the number of
coming generations, is such that in the intergenerational context,
utilitarianism will tend to lead to especially sacrificial outcomes. For
all those who find the latter unacceptable, justice may then require a
distributive rather than aggregative approach.
Rawls, in his masterpiece A Theory of Justice <8>, is aware of this
major weakness of utilitarianism. Still, he considers that moving
away from the initial condition of prehistoric men is necessary for
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His theory is not only egalitarian. He is also a liberal, in the sense
that pursuing the improvement of the least well off’s situation has
to be done within the constraints we refer to as « basic liberties ». In
other words, there is a priority of guaranteeing basic liberties such
as physical integrity or freedom of expression, over the goal of
improving the socio-economic situation of the least well off. We
could thus say that if violating the egalitarian goal is acceptable
during the accumulation phase, it is only so as long as we need to
set up institutions capable of defending people’s basic liberties, this
latter objective being granted priority over the egalitarian one.
Moreover, if we can show empirically that the richer a democratic
state is (in terms of GDP) the longer its democratic nature is likely
to last, we then have an empirical element able to support the claim
that setting up just institutions requires wealth to have reached a
sufficient level.
reasons of justice. In order to accommodate both concerns, he ends
up with a two-stage model in which a steady state stage follows an
accumulation phase. During the accumulation period, the
intergenerational principle is identical to the utilitarian one
(compulsory savings). This stage is supposed to have a limited
duration though. And the goal underlying such a need for
accumulation has nothing to do with maximizing the size of the
intergenerational utility pie. Rather, for Rawls, the accumulation
stage aims at allowing for economic wealth to be such that a
minimum stability of just institutions is guaranteed. As soon as this
point is reached, accumulation ceases being compulsory. We then
enter the steady-state stage in which the Rawlsian principle is
identical this time to the one defended by theories of indirect
reciprocity or collective property.
With Rawls, we believe that such a « two stage » model is needed.
And we also think that he is right in defending compulsory savings
during the accumulation phase. The legitimacy of the latter view is
not self-evident however. What is potentially shocking for an
egalitarian like Rawls is to propose – for the accumulation phase – a
principle of compulsory savings that clearly violates a concern for
the least well off. As a matter of fact, it is clearly unfair, from an
egalitarian viewpoint, to require savings from the first generations.
For such a requirement brings about an intergenerational world in
which the least well off (generation) is not in the best possible
situation (since if it did not have to save, it would end up being
much better off). Limiting ourselves to a prohibition on dis-savings
would not have such consequences. Again, Rawls is aware of this
problem. And still, he sticks to compulsory savings during that
stage. Let us provide here a short defence of his view along
Rawlsian lines.
Luck Egalitarianism
Phase 1
Phase 2
While agreeing with the idea of a « two stages » theory and with the
principle Rawls defends for the accumulation phase, we disagree
with the principle he proposes for the steady-state stage. For we
think egalitarians should defend a different principle at that stage.
Which one ? Rather than just prohibiting dissavings, egalitarians
should also call for a prohibition on savings. This position may seem
absurd at first. For what would be morally wrong with a generation
of parents voluntarily tightening up their belts in order to guarantee
their children a better existence than the one they have been able to
benefit from. Towards whom would that be unfair ? Here is the
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answer : towards the least well off members of these parents’
For let us envisage the case of a generation anticipating that, at the
end of its existence, it may end up having transferred a surplus to
the next generation, i.e. more (per head) than what it inherited from
the previous one. The point here is that such a surplus should
benefit the least well off members of the current generation rather
than the next generation as a whole. Transferring more to the future
will sacrifice as much for today’s least well off people. And it is only
as long as each generation sticks to a prohibition on both
(intergenerational) dissavings and savings that the intergenerational
world we are bringing about will be the one in which the least well
off, whatever the generation they belong to, are less disadvantaged
than they could ever be in a world differently organised.
Admittedly, were such a surplus to be transferred to the next
generation, it could very well benefit its least advantaged members.
We need to make sure however that the least well off members of
our own generation do not then end up with a situation worse than
the one of those least advantaged members of the next generation.
Hence, our closed principle (neither savings, nor dis-savings)
It will not be possible to discuss here the details of this proposal.
What needs to be stressed however is that if long term growth is
only possible if at least some generations will have transferred to
the next ones more than they had themselves inherited, the idea of
prohibition on savings also entails that growth should in principle be
regarded as intergenerationally unjust. This is one among several
possible « anti-growth » arguments.
It is important to see how
distinctive it is. Let us mention four such « anti-growth »
arguments, each of them being different from the one defended
here. According to the first one, insofar as growth would increase
internationally), it would have to be rejected for that (strict
egalitarian) reason. According to a second argument, found in
Bonin <10>, a state taking measures to boost growth would violate
the neutrality constraint, according to which public authorities
should remain as neutral as possible towards people’s various
conceptions of the good life. As to the third argument, it says that
growth is vain, if not counter-productive, from the point of view of
conceptions of the good life that are really worth it. We would not
need so much material wealth per head to be able to lead a happy
life. Finally, a fourth argument considers growth, insofar as it
mobilizes large amounts of physical resources, as unsustainable at
the current rate. Each of these arguments would deserve closer
scrutiny, both on their normative assumptions and on their
empirical plausibility. Notice moreover that only the two first ones
are justice-based ones, as is our intergenerational anti-growth
argument here. Still, it is now clear that the « anti-growth »
argument we are defending differs from the four ones we have just
What is also worth stressing is that we end up with an egalitarian
theory whose implications for the steady-state stage do not converge
with the ones of the indirect reciprocity or of the collective property
views. Moreover, there is another angle from which the proposed
theory is different from those two views. Let us consider the case of
a future natural phenomenon such as an Earthquake, adversely
affecting the situation of the next generation. From an intra-
generational perspective, an Earthquake is generally expected to
give rise to compensatory measures funded by society as a whole to
the benefit of those unlucky people who are especially affected, due
to no fault of their own. For luck egalitarians consider that any
For further developments : <9>, chap. 4
See Ibidem , pp. 224-225
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disadvantage resulting from someone’s circumstances (as opposed
to her choices) should be fully compensated by the rest of society.
Why would this not be the case in the intergenerational context as
well ?
If we were able to predict – by extraordinary means – the
occurrence and importance of such future Earthquakes and if we
could show that the next generation is especially likely to be
negatively affected, to a much larger extent than us who – ex
hypothesi – would not have to suffer any Earthquake, then we
would have to switch from a prohibition on savings (the principle)
to an obligation to save (one of the exceptions to this principle). And
we would have to save to such an extent that the next generation
would not end up with circumstances worse than the ones we will
end up having come across. Such compulsory savings in case of
anticipatable future adverse circumstances affecting the next
generation correspond with a rationale very different from the
utilitarian one or from the one Rawlsians could provide for the
accumulation phase. Moreover, it does not seem that indirect
reciprocity theory would ever be able to justify such an obligation to
save (in the intergenerational sense again) for that clearly entails
that we should transfer more to the next generation than what we
received from the previous one. The same remark holds as well
towards the idea of intergenerational collective property.
Having surveyed different theories of intergenerational justice and
having indicated the reasons why we believe the luck egalitarian
one supports principles that are both clearly distinct and defensible,
let us now turn to Brundtland’s definition of sustainable
development. Our claim is that such a definition is insufficient in
two respects if we adopt a luck egalitarian point of view. A word of
caution however : neither do we claim that the Brundtland report
provides us with the only possible definition of sustainability,
do we claim that the Brundtlandian principle as stated hereinafter
does full justice to the complexity of her views. The only point here
is that this principle as so often mobilized in the scientific literature
and in political discourse falls short for two reasons based on what
luck egalitarians believe would be the right view of
intergenerational justice.
Let us state then Brundtland’s principle of sustainability :
« Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs ».
The concept of needs can of course be
understood in a more or less broad sense. Even if we do not
consider it as necessarily equivalent to the idea of « basic need »,
there remains certainly an idea that the scope of our needs could not
meaningfully be taken in an extremely broad way, and that once
coverage for each one’s needs is being provided for, justice will not
require any further redistribution. This becomes clear once we stick
to a concept of basic needs and ask – to take an intragenerational
example again - whether someone with one finger missing due to
genetic malformation would deserve any compensation on grounds
of justice, knowing that she would be perfectly capable of leading a
minimally flourishing life without such a compensation.
Sufficientarians (i.e. those claiming that once coverage for needs is
provided for, no further redistribution is required) will claim that
no compensation should be expected. Luck egalitarians will
Brundtland’s Sufficientarianism
See e.g. <11>
<1>, at p. 43
The Egalitarian Case Against Brundtland’s Sustainability : 8

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certainly disagree - at least in some cases - insofar as the handicap at
stake is strictly the result of this person’s circumstances. This
illustrates the central difference between both views. If we adopt,
e.g., a welfarist metric, for sufficientarians, as long as each of us is
able to reach a given threshold of well-being, justice does not
require any further redistribution. In contrast, luck egalitarians will
only stop calling for further redistribution once all disadvantages
due to brute bad luck will have been compensated for by society as
a whole.
Hence, for luck egalitarians, Brundtland’s sufficientarianism is
unable to exclude two types of behaviours that should be regarded
as unfair. First, it allows a possibly significant degree of dissavings
as long as there remains a significant margin once we have ensured
for the capacity of the next generation to provide for its own (basic)
needs. Such dis-savings would not be deemed acceptable by
(intergenerational) savings as long as this does not jeopardize the
ability of the current generation to provide for its own needs, such
sufficientarianism would violate the egalitarian principle of
prohibition on savings. Hence, all those who generally take
seriously the intuitions of luck egalitarianism should not abandon
them once they are dealing with intergenerational issues. And if
they don’t, they should see that such a view certainly advocates
principles that are in two important respects very different from
Brundtland’s sufficientarianism.
This short paper was based on a set of simplifying assumptions.
Population was assumed to remain constant. The composition of
the basket of goods to be transferred to the next generation was left
undiscussed. Uncertainty problems were left aside as well. We just
looked at intergenerational transfers from a purely quantitative
point of view, using two categories (savings/dissavings) and three
modalities (prohibition, authorisation and obligation). Still, with
such assumptions in mind, it is fascinating to see that, based on
some of our standard theories of justice, we can uncover very
different logics of intergenerational justice and separate out clearly
distinct operational principles corresponding to such logics. Such an
analysis also helps us to see that for a luck egalitarian, Brundtland’s
sufficientarian principle does not allow us to exclude what can be
seen as two major intergenerational injustices.
<1> G. H. Brundtland et al. , Our Common Future,: Oxford University Press,
Oxford/New York (1987), 400 p.
<2> B. Barry, « Justice as Reciprocity », in Liberty and Justice, Oxford
University Press, Oxford (1989) 211-241
<3> A. Masson, « Quelle solidarité intergénérationnelle ? », Notes de la
Fondation Saint Simon (Paris) (1999), issue 103
<4> K. A. Wade-Benzoni, « A Golden Rule Over Time : Reciprocity in
Intergenerational Allocation Decisions », Academy of Management Journal
45/5 (2002) 1011-1028
<5> D. Cosandey, La faillite coupable des retraites. Comment nos assurances
vieillesse font chuter la natalité , L’Harmattan, Paris (2003), 164 p.
<6> J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government , Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge (1690) 1967 (Laslett ed.).
<7> L. Bourgeois, Solidarité, Armand Colin, Paris (1902)
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The Egalitarian Case Against Brundtland’s Sustainability : 10
<8> J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (revised edition), Oxford University Press,
Oxford (1999), 538 p.
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    Created: 01 May 2006 – Last modified: 04 May 2013